arXiv (All)
open access
Backdoor Channels Hidden in Latent Space: Extending Cryptographic Undetectability to Modern Neural Networks
Recent cryptographic results establish that neural networks can be backdoored such that no efficient algorithm can distinguish them from a clean model. These guarantees, however, have been confined to stylised architectures of limited practical relevance, leaving open whether comparable undetectabil
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Backdoor Channels Hidden in Latent Space: Cryptographic Undetectability in Modern Neural Networks#180584
- Implementing a White-Box Undetectable Backdoor for Random Fourier Features#1110763
- Implementing a White-Box Undetectable Backdoor for Random Fourier Features#919262
- Models Designed to Forget: Machine Unlearning via Key Deletion#1128565
- Provable one-poison backdoor attacks on linear models and ReLU neural networks#677401
Record · ID 973171
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive