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MARS: Detecting Unauthorized Variable Manipulations in Multi-Application PLC Runtimes
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) increasingly run multiple applications alongside the main control program, with shared access to PLC variables. Yet, Industrial Control System (ICS) defenses primarily detect malicious updates by checking whether variable values violate expected bounds, without
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