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The Economics of Postponement: Zombie Firms, Enforcement, and the Invisible Cost of Deferred Consequence
This article examines the structural convergence between the phenomenon of so-called zombie firms and weaknesses in administrative enforcement in Brazil, through an incentive-based institutional framework. It begins with the empirical observation that the artificial survival of financially unviable
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