PhilArchive
open access
The Liar Paradox - A Case of Mistaken Truth Attribution
A semantic solution to the liar paradox (“This statement is not true”) is presented in this article. Since the liar paradox seems to evince a contradiction, the principle of non-contradiction is preliminarily discussed, in order to determine whether dismissing this principle may be reason enough to stop considering the liar paradox a problem. No conclusive outcome with respect to the value of this principle is aspired to here, so that the inquiry is not concluded at this point and the option to explore an alternative, semantic, solution remains open. This proposed solution is focused on what the liar paradox expresses and what it fails to express.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUTH PARADOX#84187
- The Koinōnia of Non-Being and Logos in the Sophist Account of Falsehood#777158
- Truth and The Ambiguity of Negation#751425
- The Paradox of Translation#776871
- Ambiguity#429882
Record · ID 98374
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive