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Pragmatic self-refutation, the denial of water, and alternative conceptual schemes
Pragmatic self-refutation is when one asserts something but one’s act of assertion refutes the content of that assertion. In this paper, I consider whether Donald Davidson is guilty of this when arguing against the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes.
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