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When Explanation Turns on Itself
Certain philosophical problems arise not from missing facts, but from a structural limit of explanation. This paper argues that explanation cannot account for the conditions that make explanation itself possible, and that the hard problem of consciousness exemplifies this limit at the level of the explanatory standpoint itself.
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