A defense of Academic skepticism

I will defend a form of Academic skepticism that denies the possibility of knowledge about the external world. The standard argument for it relies on internalism and infallibilism, doctrines that were widely accepted in the history of epistemology until the late 20th century. Contemporary epistemologists typically deny at least one of them, because together they lead to skepticism. Skepticism is thought to be bad because it conflicts with common sense, our ordinary epistemic practices, and linguistic data. I will argue that this is not so, that Academic skepticism gives in fact a better explanation of our intuitions and linguistic data than dogmatic epistemology. Finally, following the steps of Arcesilaus, Carneades and Hume, I will show how Academic skepticism can give a good response to the Stoics’ Apraxia objection that skepticism makes rational action and good life impossible. On the contrary, it is skepticism that makes a good and flourishing life possible.