Conceptio › Archive › PhilArchive
PhilArchive open access

Consent, Uptake, and Wronging

Healey, Richard
PhilArchive · Papers
Open Source ↗
philosophy
The power of consent enables one person to give another person a moral permission by releasing them from a duty. The examples of consent to sex, surgery, and the sharing of property are familiar. This article considers whether consent requires uptake from the consent-receiver if they are to acquire this moral permission. Most philosophers writing about the ethics of consent suggest that uptake is not necessary. This article argues, by contrast, that we should endorse an uptake condition for consent-based permissions. It does so by locating an uptake condition within a general account of wronging and its interpersonal significance. On the view defended, consent-sensitive duties should be interpreted as requiring a consent-receiver to treat consent as a deliberative constraint on action. On this view, if a consent-receiver acts without recognizing that consent has been given, they violate the consent-sensitive duty they owe to the consent-giver.
Conceptio Open Archive

Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio

Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.

This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗

Related documents

Record · ID 99561
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive