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On accessibility of the core in mutidimensional spatial majority voting situations
In this paper we consider situations of (multidimensional) spatial majority voting. We analyze such situations having an even number (greater than or equal to 4) of voters and assume that each voter's preference over the set of policies is ``Euclidean": i.e., each voter has a most preferred ``ideal"
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