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From Cycle Space to Cycle Manifold: Limits and Achievability of Blind False Data Injection Attacks
A false data injection attack (FDIA) can change the estimated grid state while evading a residual-based bad data detector (BDD). Existing blind attacks learn a low-rank measurement subspace, but this algebraic view does not state the physical grid constraints that make an attack stealthy or the mini
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