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A priori data-driven robustness guarantees on strategic deviations from generalised Nash equilibria
In this paper we focus on noncooperative games with uncertain constraints coupling the agents' decisions. We consider a setting where bounded deviations of agents' decisions from the equilibrium are possible, and uncertain constraints are inferred from data. Building upon recent advances in the so c
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