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Reflective equilibrium, considered moral judgments, and interests – a response to Thomas Kelly and Sarah McGrath
Which moral judgments should one pay attention to in building a moral philosophy? Thomas Kelly and Sarah McGrath object to John Rawls’s suggestion to not rely on judgments heavily bound up with one’s own interests. I propose a solution in response to the objection.
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