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Epsilon-Nash Equilibria in History-Dependent SA-MDPs
We study state-adversarial Markov decision processes (SA-MDP) as a game of observation-space attacks: at each step, an agent selects an action from a received observation while an adversary$\unicode{x2014}$who knows the true state the agent is in$\unicode{x2014}$chooses a perturbed observation withi
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