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Revealed Preferences of One-Sided Matching
I find the testable implications of the core in an exchange economy with unit demand when agents' preferences are unobserved. To do so, I develop a model of aggregate matchings in which the core is falsifiable; the identifying assumption is that agents' preferences are solely determined by observabl
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