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On the Strong Matroid Secretary Conjecture and Beyond
The strong matroid secretary conjecture asserts that every matroid admits a $1/e$-competitive secretary algorithm, matching the classical single-choice guarantee. We formulate a finite linear program whose value is the optimal ordinal competitive ratio of any fixed matroid; for all matroids of posit
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