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How Well Can Strategyproof Tournament Rules Resist Pairwise Manipulation?
A tournament rule maps the outcomes of all pairwise matches among $n$ teams to a possibly randomized winner. Desirable rules should be Condorcet consistent and monotone, yet also resistant to manipulation among coalition. Prior work mostly measures such manipulation additively through $k$-strongly n
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