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Efficient Nash Equilibrium Computation for Cybersecurity Games
Computing Nash equilibria of simulation-based cybersecurity games with policy-space response oracles (PSRO) is bottlenecked by payoff estimation: every payoff-matrix entry costs Monte-Carlo rollouts of a slow simulator, while policies and restricted-game solves are cheap. We introduce Regret-Weighte
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