Logic Conditions of Cognition (Beyond Kant)

Debates in epistemology and philosophy of science often proceed as if any well-formed claim were, in principle, eligible for empirical confirmation or refutation. Disagreements are then framed in terms of evidence, interpretation, or methodology. This paper argues that such debates presuppose a logically prior condition that is rarely made explicit: not all claims qualify as candidates for epistemic evaluation at all. The central thesis is that a claim can enter empirical inquiry only if it determines conditions under which it could be mistaken. If no such conditions can be specified, empirical investigation is not merely inconclusive but logically inapplicable. This is not an empirical failure, but a structural one. The paper distinguishes between empirical falsification and structural ineligibility, and argues that the latter precedes and constrains the former. Building on a minimal, non-metaphysical analysis, the paper identifies basic logical preconditions that any epistemic claim must satisfy in order to enter evaluation. In particular, a claim must allow for distinguishable alternatives, specify relations to possible evidential conditions, and admit the possibility of error. Claims that fail to meet these conditions are not rejected as false; they are excluded as epistemically ineligible. The analysis is eliminative rather than constructive. It does not propose a theory of cognition, but specifies a necessary condition for epistemic function: only claims that generate differences in possible outcomes can be assessed, tested, or disputed. The reference to Kant in the title is methodological rather than doctrinal. Whereas Kant investigated the conditions of the possibility of experience, the present work examines the logical conditions under which claims can qualify as candidates for cognition in the first place