The ethics of vulnerability and the virtue of empathy. Reflections on the Palestinian genocide

This paper examines the ethics of vulnerability and the central role of empathy as a virtue in responding to extreme human suffering of the Palestinian population in Gaza. First, it analyzes various dimensions of vulnerability—physical, emotional, and cognitive, ontological, and circumstantial—in the context of armed conflict and systemic dehumanization. The discussion incorporates sentimentalist virtue ethics, to argue that empathy is both an essential social bond and a moral obligation, especially when addressing the suffering caused by genocide. The paper distinguishes between strong and weak empathy, proposing that the former is necessary to counteract the indifference and schadenfreude observed in some responses to Gaza’s plight. By emphasizing the interplay between ontological and circumstantial vulnerabilities, the analysis extends beyond care ethics, positioning empathy as a cardinal virtue for fostering moral accountability, advocating for care policies, and reinforcing global social bonds. Finally, it argues that empathy has intrinsic value and it has a role as a foundational moral trait, with its absence marking moral failure and, in some cases, wickedness.