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Strategic Pricing in Electricity Markets with Pollution Constraints
We introduce a new model for a regulated day-ahead type auction-based electrical market in which the system operator can measure and limit the producer's emissions when choosing its optimal dispatch. We prove properties of this market model that describe it as a generalization to other previous work
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