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Unit commitment constrained Nash equilibrium in power markets
Equilibrium modeling for power markets usually assumes convexity of each players' optimization problem. Although the importance of accounting for fixed generation costs and start-up costs, minimum generation levels and/or minimum up-time and down-time restrictions in production scheduling is widely
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