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Minimax-Optimal Online Contract Design with Unrestricted Bounded Contracts
We study repeated contract design when a principal observes outcomes but not the actions that generate them. The principal may use any bounded outcome-contingent payment vector, and the agent's best response can make expected profit discontinuous in those payments. For every fixed number $m\ge2$ of
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