arXiv (OAI Expanded)
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Robust Contracting for Sequential Search
A principal contracts with an agent who sequentially searches over projects to generate a prize. The principal is unaware of the agent's full set of projects and evaluates a contract by its worst-case performance. We characterize the principal's robustly optimal contracts, which are all debt-like: t
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