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Mutual Evaluation and Supervision without Peers
This article introduces mutual evaluation of a replicable task worker and a critic that incentivizes truthful reporting, both modeled as strategic agents. The critic chooses a finite-valued rule that induces an evaluation score on joint report laws. Their common payoff is analyzed through regret rel
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