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Information Structure of Defection Decisions in a Colonel Blotto Model of Deterrence
In strategic interactions, deterrence is an outcome where one party incentivizes the other party to not participate. This concept can be applied to Colonel Blotto games between two generals where troops can be deterred from following orders by the actions of the opposing general. In this setting, de
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