arXiv (All)
open access
Algorithmic Collusion and the Complexity of Information-Value-Free Equilibria
computational-complexitycomputer-science-and-game-theorydata-structures-and-algorithmsmachine-learning
A (coarse) correlated equilibrium (CE) is information-value-free (IVF) if a player can match the payoff obtained from recommendations by committing to a fixed action. Motivated by the problem of regulating algorithmic collusion, this refinement was introduced by Hartline, Wang, and Zhang [EC'26], wh
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Fair Stable Matching: A Nash Social Welfare Approach#632893
- Envy-Free Decompositions of Random Assignments: Settling Four Agents, and What Lies Beyond#1129789
- Checking Cheap Talk#1116080
- Keep Everyone Happy: Online Fair Division of Numerous Items with Few Copies#821391
- Which Nash Equilibrium? Solver-Dependent Selection on Zero-Sum Nash Polytopes#319653
Record · ID 1037440
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive