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A Red-Team Study of Anthropic Fable 5 & Opus 4.8 Models
We evaluate the adversarial robustness of three frontier large language models (LLMs) developed by Anthropic, Opus 4.8, Fable 5 and its successor Fable 5.1, against four families of automated jailbreak attack across 7,826 harmful intents spanning a ten-category harm taxonomy. Using the HackAgent red
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