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Suboptimality Loss for Inverse Learning from Imperfect Equilibria
Many modern systems involve the strategic interaction of multiple agents. In such settings, observed actions typically reflect equilibrium behavior under utilities that are only partially known. Recovering these hidden utilities from data - the central goal of inverse game theory - is key for predic
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