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A Stable-Set Bound and Maximal Numbers of Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games
Quint and Shubik (1997) conjectured that a non-degenerate n-by-n game has at most 2^n-1 Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. The conjecture is true for n at most 4 but false for n=6 or larger. We answer it positively for the remaining case n=5, which had been open since 1999. The problem can be tran
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