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Data-Driven Mechanism Design via Multi-Agent Revealed Preferences
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to steer equilibria towards social optimality, and to certify wh
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