arXiv (All)
open access
A Tale of Two Monopolies
We apply marginal analysis à la Bulow and Roberts (1989) to characterize revenue-maximizing selling mechanisms for a multiproduct monopoly. We derive marginal revenue from price perturbations over arbitrary sets of bundles and show that optimal mechanisms admit no revenue-increasing perturbation for
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- On the profitability of behaviour‐based price discrimination under purchase‐dependent preferences#1146405
- Subquadratic Subsidies for Nonnegative or Nonpositive Valuations#985643
- Assortment Optimization under Logit-Based Multi-Purchase Choice Models#1063875
- "Market Definition in Monopoly Cases: A Paradigm is Missing,"#942181
- Multi-Principal Competition for an Exclusive Agent: characterization and approximation of Nash Equilibria#927716
Record · ID 1051419
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive