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Strategic Disclosure of Action Space in Principal-Agent Contracts
We study strategic disclosure of the action space in principal-agent contracting, where an agent selects a disclosed action set to shape the principal's perception of her capabilities before contract design. Unaware of the strategic disclosure, the principal designs a revenue-optimal contract as if
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