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Prophet Inequalities Beyond Utilitarian Social Welfare
In the classical i.i.d. prophet-inequality problem, a single item is allocated to one of $n$ agents who arrive sequentially, with values drawn independently from a known distribution. When an agent arrives, their value is revealed, and the algorithm must immediately allocate the item or continue. Th
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