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Credible AUctions via MPC Gadgets: Bounding Information Leakage Under Abort
The design of credible auctions---mechanisms where a revenue-maximizing auctioneer has no incentive to deviate from the protocol---faces a fundamental cryptographic barrier when the auctioneer controls shill bidders. While a natural approach is to use Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) to remove t
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