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Do Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks Threaten Electronic Polling Stations? Scenarios and Recommendations
This paper investigates the threat to ballot secrecy in the Brazilian electronic voting machine (UEB) posed by electromagnetic side-channel attacks, also known as TEMPEST attacks. In these attacks, screen content can be reconstructed remotely by intercepting electromagnetic emanations associated w
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