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Coordinated Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attacks for Voter--Ballot Linking: A Case Study of the Brazilian E-Polling System
In this work, we show how two adversaries (Eve and Mallory) can coordinate an electromagnetic side-channel attack to recon- struct the vote displayed on an e-voting machine (EVM) and link it to a specific voter (Alice). Assuming that Eve has access to a place adjacent to the e-polling room (e.g., re
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