Phenomenal Structure Without Ontological Mystery: Continuity, Givenness, and Experience as Rendering

Phenomenal experience is typically treated as immediately given within philosophy of mind, yet its internal structure-continuity, unity, and perspectival stability-remains largely underanalyzed. While experience presents itself as seamless and self-evident, attempts to explain these features often rely on substantive claims about consciousness as a fundamental entity, leading to persistent theoretical tension. This tension arises because explanatory accounts that successfully address behavior, cognition, and neural correlates struggle to account for the apparent immediacy and unity of experience without invoking ontologically primitive consciousness or irreducible qualia. What remains missing is a framework capable of explaining the structure of experience itself without treating phenomenology as a foundational datum. This paper proposes a structural analysis of phenomenal experience using the Three-Circle Ontology, which distinguishes ontological ground, structural possibility, and rendered experience. Within this framework, experience is analyzed as a structured rendering constrained by underlying relations rather than as an ontological primitive. The paper does not offer a theory of consciousness, a phenomenological reduction, or a neuroscientific account. Its primary contribution is to reframe phenomenal continuity and experiential givenness as consequences of rendering structure and resolution limits, thereby clarifying phenomenology without metaphysical inflation.