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Coalitional Manipulation and Target Set Correspondences
We study coalitional manipulation of interval-valued social choice correspondences on the single-peaked domain. In the single-valued model, strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness coincide within the standard class of peaks-only social choice functions, so generalized median voter rules reta
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