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Second-Best Gains from Trade in Matching Markets
We study gains from trade (GFT) in two-sided matching markets with independent private types and arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraints. The second-best benchmark is the maximum expected GFT achievable by a Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational mechanism that is str
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