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EF1-Constrained Nash Social Welfare with Identical Additive Valuations: Complexity, Guarantees, and Experiments
We study the allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical additive valuations, focusing on envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and Nash social welfare (NSW). Since every maximum-NSW allocation is EF1 under additive valuations, the associated threshold problem inherits the known strong
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