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Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World
We study a model of delegation in which a principal takes a multidimensional action and an agent has private information about a multidimensional state. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an arbitrary mechanism to maximize the principal's expected payoff. A key step shows that a func
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