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Loyal Agents: Training LLM Agents to Protect Principal Interests Under Strategic Information Asymmetry
As LLMs increasingly act as delegated agents, they are expected to protect principals' interests when interacting with external parties. Standard alignment objectives, such as helpfulness, harmlessness, and honesty, do not specify how agents should protect principals' strategic interests under deleg
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