The Problem of Method and Self-Knowledge in Kant's Transcendental Philosophy

Philosophy is a discipline that knows its own knowing, and Kant’s Critique is precisely such an attempt of self-knowledge. However, is such self-knowledge possible within the domains of Kant’s own philosophy? In this paper, I problematize the possibility of this philosophical self-knowledge that methodologically grounds Kant’s critical inquiry into the conditions of possibility of objective knowledge, and show that there is no theoretical resource within Kant’s philosophy that sufficiently justifies this methodological self-knowledge. The aim of this paper is to elucidate a productive tension between the content of Kant’s critical philosophy and its method. By thinking through and taking seriously the methodological problem of self-knowledge, this paper shows that Kant’s Critique not only presents us with a difficulty that deepens our understanding of the nature of self-knowledge, but it is also a point of departure that fruitfully motivates the further developments of Kant’s own thinking and subsequent German philosophies.