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How Much Must a Private Mempool Hide? Exact Leakage Thresholds for Sandwich Attacks
Private and encrypted mempools hide pending transactions to stop sandwich attacks and other forms of maximal extractable value (MEV), but what they hide is rarely everything: a transaction's pair, direction, and a coarse range for its size can still leak. How much leakage makes sandwiching pay? We a
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