arXiv (OAI Expanded)
open access
Anchor-proofness in Voting
We study how order-dependent individual evaluations affect collective decision-making. We consider a voting environment in which voters have intrinsic preference rankings and acceptability thresholds, but form approval ballots sequentially as alternatives are presented by a social planner. Because a
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