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Approval-Based Apportionment: Like Portioning, Approximately like Committee Voting
We study approval-based apportionment, a variant of committee elections in which candidates ("parties") can be selected several times. We show that the proportionality axioms EJR, EJR+, and FJR coincide, and so do PJR, PJR+, and FPJR; that Lindahl priceability, an axiom implying core stability, is e
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