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Symmetric solution of the Bellman optimality equation for repeated harmony game
In social dilemma games, additional rewards or punishments have been studied as means of promoting cooperation. Therefore, it is important to investigate the ideal situation, in which such an additional payoff would change the game. In this study, we investigated the symmetric solution of the Bellma
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