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Belief Elicitation from Agents with Competing Incentives
We study the problem of eliciting beliefs about an uncertain future event, where the reported beliefs are used to inform a decision. Unlike the standard model of belief elicitation, in our model the belief-reporting agents (or recommenders) have a vested interest in the decision and may attempt to c
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