arXiv (All)
open access
Beyond Incentive Compatibility: Rational Harm-Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) allocate scarce block space in blockchains. Prior work focuses on incentive compatibility (IC): honest behavior maximizes the payoff of each strategic player. We introduce rational-harm proofness (RHP), which rules out deviations that harm honest participants withou
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Can Hybrid Voluntarism Solve the Indeterminacy Problem of the Reasons Responsiveness Account of Rationality?#702273
- Bargaining with Myself: Humean Temptation and Rational Resistance#78531
- Harm and Prudence#693035
- Retaliation Rationalized: Gauthier's Solution to the Deterrence Dilemma#750203
- Cheap Tactics in Competitive Gaming#80244
Record · ID 1115961
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive