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Silent Failures in Agentic Security Evaluation: A Validated Harness for Tool-Call Mediation Under Indirect Prompt Injection
LLM agents that invoke privileged tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI), in which adversarial instructions embedded in retrieved data hijack the agent's actions. A growing body of work evaluates defenses against IPI, but the validity of that evaluation is rarely examined. We audit
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